

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

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ACDE-00 ERDE-00 /089 W

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P R 071416Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4194

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 18250

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR, GW

SUBJECT: FRG POLICY MAKING ON MBFR

REFS: (A) MBFR VIENNA 506 DTG 311645Z OCT 75

(B) STATE 246824 DTG 170027Z OCT 75

(C) STATE 253348 DTG 240125Z OCT 75

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BEGIN SUMMARY: THE MBFR BUREAUCRACY IN THE FRG IS CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN THAT IN THE US. ACCORDINGLY, MOVEMENT OF PAPERS BETWEEN SENIOR AND WORKING LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT IS FACILITATED. BECAUSE OF THE LEANER FRG ORGANIZATION, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER HAVE BEEN ABLE TO APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE THE BASIC POSITIONS ADVANCED BY WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS AS THEY RELATE TO OPTION III. WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS

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DO NOT BELIEVE THE FRG IS BLOCKING ALLIANCE AGREEMENT

ON OPTION III, BUT RATHER THAT WORK IN NATO IS PROGRESS-
ING SATISFACTORILY ALBEIT SLOWLY. THE RECENT US
DEMARCHE CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONSTERNATION AT THE
WORKING LEVEL, TRIGGERING A VISIT TO LONDON FOR
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS TO ANALYZE THE US MOVE. OUR
FONOFF AND FMOD CONTACTS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR BELIEF
THAT THE BEST WAY TO COMPLETE THE DRAFT GUIDANCE AND
POSITION PAPER ON OPTION III WOULD BE FOR THE US, FRG
AND UK TO HOLD ANOTHER TRILATERAL DISCUSSION,
NOT BREAKING UP UNTIL A CONSENSUS IS OBTAINED.
END SUMMARY

1. THE DELEGATION IN REF A OFFERED ITS OPINION THAT
THE US SHOULD TACKLE THE FRG AGAIN ON OPTION III
EQUIPMENT ISSUES AT A LEVEL HIGHER THAN FRG NATO REP
HOYNCK. HOYNCK, OF COURSE, WAS SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS
WHEN HE PRESENTED THE FRG COUNTER-OFFER TO THE US
COMPROMISE PROPOSAL ON DRAFT GUIDANCE ISSUES (REF C).
RUTH WOULD HAVE MADE A SIMILAR PRESENTATION IN BONN BUT
FOR THE FACT HE WAS IN LONDON ON OCT. 29 TO CONSULT
WITH THE BRITISH ON THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE US
DEMARCHE (REF E). TO PREVENT POSSIBLY ERRONEOUS
IMPRESSIONS OF WHO SPEAKS FOR THE FRG ON MBFR, WE SET
FORTH BELOW OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CURRENT MBFR POLICY
MECHANISM IN THE FRG.

2. THE FRG BUREAUCRACY, BOTH AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND
DEFENSE MINISTRY, IS SURPRISINGLY SMALL. RUTH DIRECTS
A STAFF OF ONLY 4-5 PEOPLE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE WHILE
COL. TANDECKI IS ASSISTED BY ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER OF
PEOPLE IN FMOD. BECAUSE OF THIS LEAN ORGANIZATION,
CLEARANCES BETWEEN THE MINISTRIES CAN BE OBTAINED
QUICKLY AND THE PAPER FLOW BETWEEN THE WORKING AND
SENIOR LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IS QUITE FAST. MOREOVER,
WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FONOFF AND FMOD ARE
EXCELLENT.

3. BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DEFENSE MINISTER
LEBER HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN MBFR MATTERS AT LEAST TO
THE POINT THAT THEY PROVIDE GENERAL GUIDANCE AND
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APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE THE POSITIONS WHICH THE FONOFF
INSTRUCTS THE NATO REP TO ADVANCE ON OPTION III.
GENSCHER IS A VORACIOUS READER WHO DEMANDS MORE RATHER
THAN LESS DETAIL FROM HIS STAFF ON POLICY ISSUES. THIS
APPLIES TO MBFR AS WELL. GENSCHER WAS WELL BRIEFED
TO DISCUSS THE "EUROPEAN RESERVATION" ASPECT OF MBFR
AT THE EC-NINE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS AT LUCCA.
ACCORDING TO FONOFF POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL, IT

WAS GENSCHER WHO CARRIED THE ARGUMENT, SUGGESTING THAT THIS MATTER BE STUDIED FURTHER.

4. SIMILARLY, DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER HAS FOLLOWED THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST. RECENTLY, HE INVITED MEMBERS OF THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO FMOD FOR AN INFORMAL EVENING DISCUSSION ON THE FRG APPROACH TO

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4195

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

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MBFR. LEBER WAS ALSO WELL BRIEFED ON MBFR FOR HIS MEETING WITH THEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER ON SEPTEMBER 28.

5. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAS NOT BEEN KEPT INFORMED ON THE DETAILS OF MBFR

SINCE HIS PRINCIPAL AREA OF INTEREST LIES IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY. HOWEVER, THE CHANCELLOR WAS ONE OF THE ORIGINATORS OF THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL TROOP REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HE WAS ALSO DEFENSE MINISTER AT THE TIME THE ALLIES WERE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. ACCORDING TO A SENIOR FONOFF SOURCE, THE CHANCELLOR RETAINS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IS FULLY AWARE OF THE BASIC POLICY DIRECTION ON WHICH HIS MINISTRIES ARE PROCEEDING.

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6. AT LEVELS BELOW GENSCHER IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, WE KNOW THAT POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE IN MBFR POLICY MAKING AND BELIEVES HIMSELF TO BE THE KEY FIGURE IN THE GOVERNMENT ON THIS PROBLEM (REF D). ANOTHER MAJOR ACTOR IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE IS DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH, A MAN WHO ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AS WITNESSED BY HIS APPOINTMENT TO THIS POSITION. BOTH VAN WELL AND ROTH PLAY VERY ACTIVE ROLES, PROVIDING EXTENSIVE GUIDANCE TO WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS.

7. AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES ARE WELL AWARE, RUTH IS THE PRINCIPAL WORKING-LEVEL MBFR OFFICIAL. RUTH ENJOYS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF LATITUDE IN THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF HIS JOB, BUT HE HAS ALWAYS CAREFULLY INSURED THAT THE POSITIONS WHICH HE FORMULATES ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY HIS SUPERIORS. RUTH TAKES THE INITIATIVE IN DRAFTING WORKING-LEVEL TEXTS FOR VETTING WITH THE ALLIES, BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL THRUST OF THE FRG POSITION IS SUPPORTED HIGHER UP.

8. THE KEY MAN ON MBFR IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IS COL. TANDECKI. TANDECKI IS AN OFFICE DIRECTOR ON THE MILITARY POLICY AND PLANS STAFF WHICH WAS HEADED UNTIL RECENTLY BY VICE ADMIRAL TREBESCH. OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH TREBESCH ON MBFR REVEALED THAT HE WAS NOT WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATION BUT WITH THE BASIC POLICY. INSTEAD, TANDECKI ENJOYED BOTH THE ADMIRAL'S SUPPORT AS WELL AS THAT OF DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER AND IS THE MAN LOOKED TO BY LEBER FOR DEFENSE MINISTRY INPUTS TO MBFR. WE HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPORT THAT TANDECKI DEALS DIRECTLY WITH LEBER'S OFFICE -- AND PERHAPS WITH LEBER HIMSELF -- ON MBFR MATTERS.

9. SEVERAL YEARS AGO, THERE WAS AN INTENSE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES ON MBFR.

THIS WAS DURING THE TIME THAT AMBASSADOR WIECK HEADED
FMOD'S PLANNING STAFF. HOWEVER, UNDER ADMIRAL
STEINHAUS, THE ROLE OF THE PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN
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DIMINISHED, AND THERE IS REALLY NO ONE ON THE STAFF
WHO MAKES AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO MBFR POLICY
MAKING IN FMOD. WITHIN FMOD, THE MBFR GAME BALL BELONGS
TO TANDECKI AND THE MILITARY POLICY AND PLANS STAFF.

10. ADMIRAL TREBESCH WILL BE RELIEVED AS OFFICE
DIRECTOR ON NOVEMBER 17 BY MAJOR GENERAL JUERGEN
BRANDT. BRANDT WAS THE PREVIOUS DEPUTY IN THE SAME
OFFICE AND HE HAS HAD PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH MBFR.
WE ANTICIPATE BRANDT WILL INVOLVE HIMSELF MORE THAN
TREBESCH IN MBFR MATTERS, BUT WE DO NOT EXPECT A
RENEWED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
MINISTRIES. WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO JUDGE
THIS AFTER OBSERVING BRANDT IN ACTION IN HIS NEW
POSITION.

11. THE DEMARCHE WHICH AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND MADE
AS DIRECTED BY REF B CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONSTERNATION
AMONG GERMAN WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS. THIS
DID NOT APPEAR TO
REFLECT CONCERN THAT THE WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS HAD
BEEN CAUGHT PURSUING POLICIES THAT HAD NO POLITICAL
SUPPORT, BUT RATHER A FEELING THAT THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN
US COULD HAVE BEEN SOLVED WITHOUT SUCH A DEMARCHE.
THOSE OFFICIALS ALSO BELIEVE THE DEMARCHE SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE BRITISH, SINCE THE UK STANCE WAS
THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM AT ISSUE. WE DETECT A CERTAIN

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

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INFO SECDEF WASHDC

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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AMOUNT OF RESENTMENT THAT WASHINGTON HAS -- UNJUSTLY
IN GERMAN EYES -- ACCUSED THE FRG OF STALLING APPROVAL
OF OPTION III.

12. WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER THE FOLLOWING OBSER-
VATIONS AS TO THE BEST TACTICAL APPROACH TO TAKE WITH
THE GERMANS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF AFFECTING THEIR
MBFR POLICY-MAKING. AS INDICATED FROM OUR DESCRIPTION
OF FRG POLICY-MAKING, GERMAN WORKING-LEVEL POSITIONS
ON OPTION III ISSUES ARE FORMULATED WITHIN THE FRAME-
WORK OF MINISTERIAL-LEVEL GENERAL GUIDANCE. FORMAL
DEMARCHES AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL URGING GERMAN SUPPORT
OF US POSITIONS WILL NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THE DESIRED
RESULTS. THEY MAY PUSH THE GERMANS TO CHANGE THEIR
POSITION, IF AT SOME COST. BUT WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND
THAT SENIOR POLICY-MAKERS ARE PROBABLY EVEN MORE
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CONSCIOUS THAN THE WORKING-LEVEL OF DEEPENING POPULAR
RESERVATIONS ON DETENTE, AND WILL BE QUITE ANXIOUS TO
SAFEGUARD THE GOVERNMENT FROM FUTURE DOMESTIC POLITICAL
ATTACKS.

13. THE RECENT SEPARATE DEMARCHES IN BONN AND LONDON
CAUSED OUR ALLIES TO WONDER HOW THE OTHER WOULD REACT.
RUTH'S TRIP TO LONDON TO CONSULT WITH THE BRITISH
OBVIOUSLY HAD TO BE APPROVED AT MORE SENIOR LEVELS IN
THE FOREIGN OFFICE. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, RUTH WAS

RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE TRIP SINCE IT DEALT PRINCIPALLY WITH AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MOTIVATIONS AND HOW EACH INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THE INITIATIVE. WE ASSUME THE BRITISH ARE ALSO MAINTAINING A DISCREET SILENCE, AT LEAST TO DATE.

14. IN THE EMBASSY'S VIEW, A MORE EFFECTIVE MECHANISM THAN DEMARCHES FOR BRINGING THE GERMANS AND PERHAPS THE BRITISH ALONG WOULD BE TO OFFER FURTHER TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND VIENNA EXPERTS. THE GERMANS PERIODICALLY REITERATE THEIR RECEPTIVITY TO ADDITIONAL TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. WE KNOW THAT GERMAN WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS INFORMALLY THE KEY POINTS OF DIFFERENCE IN THE RESPECTIVE NATIONAL POSITIONS, WITH THE SINCERE HOPE THAT SUCH DIFFERENCES COULD BE RESOLVED ON A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY BASIS BASED ON THE MERITS OF THE ARGUMENTS.

15. THE US WOULD RUN SOME RISKS SHOULD IT SELECT SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GERMANS AND BRITISH COULD COMBINE FORCES AGAINST US, ARGUING FORCEFULLY FOR NATIONAL POSITIONS WHICH THE US HAS THUS FAR OPPOSED. HOWEVER, A TRILATERAL WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO GO IN THIS DIRECTION. A PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGE OF SUCH INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE TO ENABLE THE BRITISH AND GERMANS TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. RIGHT NOW THEY APPEAR TO BE WATCHING EACH OTHER SO CLOSELY THAT OUR EFFORTS AT BILATERAL DEALINGS ARE COMPLICATED BY THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE
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OTHER'S AS WELL AS OUR POSITION. FROM THE FRG STANDPOINT, IN PARTICULAR, IT IS IMPORTANT TO SECURE SUPPORT FROM THE UK, SINCE MBFR MUST BE SOLD DOMESTICALLY BOTH IN AN EC-NINE AND NATO CONTEXT.

16. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER CONVENING A FURTHER TRILATERAL SESSION TO TRY TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING NATIONAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PRINCIPAL NATO ALLIES. WE WOULD WELCOME COMMENTS ON THIS SUGGESTION FROM US MISSION NATO, AMEMBASSY LONDON AND THE DELEGATION.
HILLENBRAND

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